The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power by III, James T. Barry
COMMENTS
The Council of Revision and the Limits of
Judicial Power
James T. Barry IIIt
The limits of judicial power and the proper role of the judici-
ary in the Constitutional scheme have always been matters of great
controversy. Recent manifestations of this controversy include the
debate over the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the breadth
of standing requirements, the inclusion of judges on the Federal
Sentencing Commission, and the role of the judiciary in appointing
independent counsels to investigate executive branch officials. Al-
though these issues are usually discussed on more abstract
grounds, the historical background of the Constitution often creeps
into the debate.
In this context, one event often mentioned is the Framers' de-
bate over and rejection of a Council of Revision at the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787. The proposed Council would have
vested the federal veto power in an institution composed of the
President and several members of the federal judiciary, presuma-
bly the Justices of the Supreme Court. The history of this proposal
illustrates how the Framers, faced with a model of judicial involve-
ment in the lawmaking process, chose instead a judiciary that took
no part in the creation of laws. In so doing, the Framers effectively
chose to preclude the courts from deciding matters of public policy
and to create a special place for the courts in the separation of
powers scheme.
Though the history of the proposed Council is relevant to
many issues that perennially confront the courts, scholars have
given that history remarkably little attention. This comment seeks
to remedy that lack of scholarship by examining the history of the
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Council of Revision and the reasons for its rejection. Section I of
the comment examines the historical and theoretical roots of the
Council of Revision, particularly its antecedents in English institu-
tions and in political theory that was popular at the time of the
Convention. This section will attempt to place the proposal for a
Council of Revision in its proper historical and theoretical context.
Section II discusses a more tangible influence on the Framers' de-
bate over the Council of Revision-the New York Council of Revi-
sion, which not only laid the blueprint for the proposed national
Council but also vividly illustrated the strengths and weaknesses of
such a proposal.
Section III discusses the proposal of, debate over, and rejec-
tion of the Council of Revision at the Constitutional Convention of
1787. This section will analyze the arguments offered for and
against the Council of Revision and discuss the historical conclu-
sions that can be validly drawn from the Council's rejection. The
comment will conclude with some observations on the current rele-
vance of the history of the Council of Revision to the modern role
of judges and the judiciary.
The Framers considered a host of well-articulated arguments
both for and against the Council of Revision and soundly defeated
the proposal on three separate occasions. In rejecting the Council,
the Framers also rejected an entrenched tradition of the role of
courts and judges in government, adopting instead a relatively
novel theory of that role. Moreover, the Framers' rejection of the
Council of Revision represented one of the rare victories for the
proponents of a "pure" separation of powers system. The propo-
nents of a flexible separation of powers system succeeded in mixing
the powers of the branches in the context of the executive veto, the
impeachment power, the appointment power and other functions,
but failed to convince other delegates that the judiciary should
share in the lawmaking power.
The Framers decided the issues raised in the Council of Revi-
sion debate with an authority and certainty that is often lacking in
the current debate over the proper role of the courts. The rejection
of the Council of Revision thus provides a significant guidepost for
resolving current controversies regarding the role of the courts in
the separation of powers system and the role of judges in the law-
making process. Indeed, the history of the proposed Council of Re-
vision illustrates the validity of Justice Holmes's famous maxim: "a
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page of history is worth a volume of logic."'
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF REvISION
A. English Precedent
The idea of a council with broad authority over the activities
of the government has its roots in primitive legal customs. Sir
Henry Sumner Maine observed that ancient societies gradually
moved from monarchic to oligarchic structures. In other words,
"the office of the king was usurped by [the] council of chiefs ..
The early history of English government reflects this trend.
The Anglo-Saxon kings of pre-Norman England retained a
council of advisers known as the witan. The king shared his inher-
ent power to declare the law with this group. As Stanley Chrimes
explained:
The old English king was not the source of law, even though it
was his duty to enforce it as far as he could-which was often
not very far. Law was tribal custom, or folkright, to which the
king was subordinate in every respect, as any other member of
the folk. He might, and on occasion did, find it necessary to
declare, with the express or tacit assent of the 'wise men' of
his realm (the witan), what the law was on certain points, and
even to commit such declarations to writing.3
After the Norman conquest, the witan, along with the king's te-
nants-in-chief and household administrators, became known as the
Curia Regis, or the King's Court.4 Early on, the King's Court itself
exercised judicial, legislative, and executive functions. Gradually,
however, the common law courts and an executive council emerged
from the King's Court and began to perform specialized functions.
Nevertheless, "[t]he courts did a certain amount of administrative
work, and the Council had a large share in judicature as well as
legislation."'5
1 New York Trust Co. v Eisner, 256 US 345, 349 (1921).
2 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law 9 (Henry Holt, 1874). For a more complete dis-
cussion of the role played by councils in primitive legal systems, see Robert H. Lowie, Prim-
itive Society 358-89 (1920).
' Stanley B. Chrimes, English Constitutional History 53-54 (Oxford, 4th ed 1967). See
also William Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law 15-16 (Meuthen, 7th ed 1956).
4 Chrimes, English Constitutional History at 64-66 (cited in note 3). According to
Holdsworth, "[tihe Curia Regis was a legislative, an administrative, and a judicial body."
Holdsworth, History of English Law at 39 (cited in note 3).
' Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 146 (Butterworth,
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By the reign of Henry VII, the King's Council, or Privy Coun-
cil, had become the sovereign's principal tool for enforcing absolute
rule through both executive and judicial means. Henry VII re-
placed the independent but inactive members of the Council with
"ruthless administrators... who could be trusted to put the king's
business before all else, and steadfastly to carry out the king's
will. ' ' 6 At the same time that Henry VII was strengthening the
Council's executive powers, Parliament sought to expand the
Council's judicial powers through legislation such as the "Star
Chamber" Act of 1487, which created a special court of general ju-
risdiction within the Council.7 Through the efforts of several
monarchs, the Tudor Privy Council, armed with extensive and
overlapping executive and judicial powers, became a "tremen-
dously energetic instrument of the royal will."8
The Stuart monarchs attempted to sustain the Privy Council
as an organ of absolute rule by using the Council's judicial compo-
nents to implement state policy directly. For example, the Stuarts
transformed the Council's court of Star Chamber from a relatively
benign court of criminal equity into a vigorous and increasingly
unpopular enforcer of state proclamations. 9 In the midst of the En-
glish Civil War, the Long Parliament, reacting to the excesses of
monarchical despotism, abolished all the judicial functions of the
various Councils. 10 Thereafter, only a weakened Privy Council,
stripped of most of its real power, remained.
With the expansion of the British Empire, however, the ad-
ministrative and judicial powers of the Privy Council were revived.
The Act of 1640 had only abolished the Council's judicial authority
within England; in the imperial territories, the Council retained its
dual role as both the dispenser of the sovereign's justice and as the
final body of approval for legislation." Throughout the Empire,
the Council exercised final say over colonial laws and served as the
ultimate court of appeal in colonial cases. A committee of the
Council, called the Lords Committee, handled most of these mat-
ters. 2 Through the Lords Committee, the Privy Council could re-
5th ed 1956). For a detailed overview of the evolution of the judicial system in England, see
id at 142-156.
' Chrimes, English Constitutional History at 90 (cited in note 3).
7 Id at 91.
8 Id at 91.
9 Id at 108, 111.
10 Statute 16 Chas I, c 10 (1640).
See Holdsworth, History of English Law at 479 (cited in note 3).
12 Julius J. Goebel, Jr., 1 History of the Supreme Court of the United States 65-69
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view colonial legislation "both in the process of administrative re-
view, and judicially, upon appeal. ' 13 As John P. Frank explained:
The most significant aspect of Privy Council review of colonial
legal problems is that, by virtue of the Council's double juris-
diction, it merged into one body the systems of both legisla-
tive and judicial review. It could disapprove of statutes by
veto and could also invalidate a colonial statute in the course
of deciding a case.14
The English Privy Council and particularly the operations of the
Lords Committee vividly illustrate England's strong tradition of
judicial involvement in legislative and executive functions.
In England, there seemed to be no question as to the propriety
of high judicial officials exercising non-judicial power. The Lord
Chancellor, for example, served simultaneously as a judge, the
head of the Chancery courts, a close adviser to the King, a cabinet
member, and President of the House of Lords. As Holdsworth put
it, the Chancellor, who was by name a judicial officer, was also in
"direct connexion with all the parts of the constitution."
The function of the English House of Lords also illustrates the
ambivalence of the English towards the notion that judicial power
be strictly separated from the other branches. The House of Lords
functioned as both a legislative and a judicial body. At the time of
the American Constitutional Convention, it constituted both the
highest court of judicial appeal and the second branch of the legis-
lature. These dual functions stemmed from Parliament's original
role as a court of law, although the Lords dropped their original
jurisdiction during the reign of Charles II and thereafter concen-
trated exclusively upon appeals. 6
The English colonial councils provided an additional prece-
dent for the intermingling of the judiciary with the powers of other
(MacMillan, 1971). See also Oliver Morton Dickerson, American Colonial Government:
1696-1765 (Russell & Russell, 1962). For a detailed summary of matters reviewed by the
Privy Council during the colonial period, see Elmer Beecher Russell, The Review of Ameri-
can Colonial Legislation by the King in Council (Octagon, 1976).
" Goebel, 1 History of the Supreme Court at 69 (cited in note 12).
14 John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 Law & Contemp
Problems 3, 5 (1948). For a discussion of specific colonial statutes invalidated by the Coun-
cil's exercise of legislative or judicial review, see Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to the Privy
Council from the American Plantations 531-551 (Columbia, 1950).
"5 Holdsworth, A History of English Law at 397 (cited in note 3).
'" For a discussion of the historical role played by the House of Lords in both the
legislative and judicial systems of England, see George Burton Adams, Constitutional His-
tory of England (Henry Holt, 1934).
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branches. Modeled on the Privy Council, the colonial councils pos-
sessed executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Although the gov-
ernor dominated colonial administration, the council sat as the up-
per house of the legislature and the court of appeals, and also
consulted with the governor on executive decisions.17 Actions of
the colonial councils were ultimately subject to review by the Privy
Council. The councils consisted of twelve members appointed by
the King upon recommendation of the Governor."" Although the
members of the colonial councils tended to be local dignitaries
rather than judges, the councils exemplify England's relaxed atti-
tude toward distinct branches, such as the judiciary, possessing
overlapping powers.
Despite these historical practices, a strong but rather idealistic
notion of judicial independence also existed in England around the
time of the Constitutional Convention. Structurally, this judicial
independence was reflected in the growing trend towards establish-
ing set tenures and steady sources of revenue for judges. 9 Yet a
grander principle, perhaps best exemplified centuries earlier by Sir
Edward Coke, lay at the heart of the notion of judicial indepen-
dence. In Dr. Bonham's Case, Coke asserted that the judiciary was
duty bound to strike down legislation contrary to the judge-created
common law.20 He maintained that the law was superior to the will
of the sovereign. It followed that it would require an independent
17 See also Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America: A Study of the
British Colonial System Before 1783 134-71 (Yale, 1930).
Is Id at 135.
19 See Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers The Rule of Law and the Idea of Inde-
pendence, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 301, 305, 322 (1989). See also Shimon Shetreet, Judicial
Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges, in Shimon
Shetreet & Jules Deschenes, Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate 590, 601-02
(Martinus Nijoff, 1985).
20 Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Reports 116, 121 (1610). For a thorough discussion of
Coke's commitment to judicial independence, see Catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and
the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) 291-317 (Little Brown,
1957). For a critical discussion of the English tradition of judicial independence, see Martin
Shapiro, Judicial Independence: The English Experience, 55 NC L Rev 577 (1977). Shapiro
argues that:
Insistence on judicial independence as an essential element in the conventional proto-
type of courts is largely derived from English experience. But it is largely derived from
rather casual impressions of what the English courts appeared to be like in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth century. When the entire history of English judicial experience is
reviewed, a far less clear picture of judicial independence emerges.
Id at 651.
Although some delegates to the Federal Convention came to similar conclusions, most pos-
sessed an almost religious faith that the English system was the exemplar of judicial inde-
pendence. See Verkuil, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 322 (cited in note 19); Shetreet, Judicial
Independence at 601 (cited in note 19).
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judiciary, uninfluenced by the legislature or executive, to expound
this law. Yet, despite this vague notion of judicial independence,
true independence of the judiciary from the other branches, an
idea which members of the Convention would later invoke in criti-
cizing the idea of a Council of Revision, was not readily apparent
in English practices.
B. Philosophical Precedents
At the time of the Convention, the Framers faced two compet-
ing models on which to structure the judiciary: one in which the
judiciary played a significant role in the formation of laws and an-
other in which the judiciary remained independent of the functions
of the other branches. These models were not only the product of
historical experience, but also of political philosophy in vogue at
the time of the founding. In developing their separation of powers
theory, a number of Framers relied on Montesquieu's Spirit of the
Laws.21 Montesquieu believed that deliberate inefficiencies, in the
form of checks and balances among the three branches, formed the
basis of free government. Centralized power bred tyranny; to en-
sure freedom, the three branches of government had to be kept
separate and in constant competition. Montesquieu supported this
theory with a description of the English government that depicted
three independent, competing branches, particularly an indepen-
dent judiciary.22 Although Montesquieu in reality espoused a fairly
pragmatic concept of the separation of powers, he was widely in-
terpreted in America as standing for the theory of completely sepa-
rate governmental branches. 23 As will become evident, a number of
21 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Book XI, ch 6 (Hafner Press, trans Thomas
Nugent, 1949). Montesquieu's views on the separation of powers were explicitly invoked by
several delegates. See the remarks of Butler, Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787 391 (Yale, 1911)("Farrand") and remarks of Madison, 2 Farrand at 34.
Yet note also that Montisquieu's views were implicit in many of the arguments made over
separation of powers issues.
22 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Book XI, ch 6 (cited in note 21). See also Forrest
McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 81-85 (U
Kansas, 1985) and Federalist 47 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers
300 (Mentor, 1961), in which Madison discusses Montesquieu and the separation of powers.
Regarding the role of the judiciary in the separation of powers, Thomas Pangle has argued
that, for Montesquieu, "[t]he separation of judicial powers is the most important part of the
separation of powers ... ." Thomas L. Pangle, Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism 132-
33 (U of Chi, 1973).
'3 For an incisive discussion of the pervasive misinterpretation and manipulation of
Montesquieu's theories in support of a radically separate separation of powers system, see
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 152-54, 449-53 (U NC,
1964). See particularly the section discussing the effect of this "enhanced definition" of the
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Framers relied on this skewed interpretation of Montesquieu in
the debates over the Council of Revision.
Other Framers were less dogmatic. They followed William
Blackstone's observation that a government ultimately has one
source of power-in England, the King; in the United States, the
people.24 Under Blackstone's reasoning, the three branches of the
English government, while technically separate, are really "thor-
oughly interwoven;" their separation was merely a matter of prac-
tical expediency.2 5 A flexible separation of powers, rather than an
absolute one, permitted liberty to flourish by checking the poten-
tial for centralization, while at the same time ensuring that govern-
ment would not be paralyzed by isolated, warring branches. In
sum, the theoretical dispute at the root of the Council of Revision
debate is reflected in this observation by Forrest McDonald:
"Where Blackstone saw one force consisting of three complemen-
tary and independent parts, . Montesquieu saw three separate
and functionally distinct branches....
This philosophical difference on the separation of powers was
particularly evident in the debates over the Council of Revision. In
those debates, it was Madison, often viewed as a strong adherent
of Montesquieu's separation of powers scheme, who took a position
akin to Blackstone's view.2 7 Other Framers, disregarding the 18th
century English judiciary's heavy involvement in the functions of
the other branches, rejected Blackstone's view of the separation of
powers in favor of the more idealistic interpretation of
Montesquieu.
The historical traditions and philosophical notions of the role
of the judiciary provided the Framers with plausible models for
either a Council of Revision or an independent judiciary. In their
debates over the Council of Revision, the Framers knew of and re-
lied upon England's historical precedents. The extensive involve-
ment of the Privy Council and the colonial councils in colonial af-
fairs made them familiar institutions to the Framers. At the
Convention, Gouverneur Morris mentioned both the House of
separation of powers upon the judiciary. Id at 453-63. Note also that the jury was Montes-
quieu's ideal vehicle for exercising judicial power, though this was not the interpretation
given his writings in America. See Pangle, Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism at 132-
133 (cited in note 22).
24 Sir William M. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 48-52 (Chicago,
1st ed facsimile, 1979).
25 McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum at 210 (cited in note 22).
26 Id at 212.
27 See text at notes 73-74.
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Lords and the Privy Council as precedents for a Council of Revi-
sion.28 Similarly, James Madison invoked the example of the
House of Lords to demonstrate that mixing the executive and judi-
cial branches on the Council was an established practice. 29 As for
the competing political philosophies influencing debates over the
Council, the Framers' familiarity with the theories of Blackstone
and Montesquieu is well documented.30 When the Framers' debate
over the Council of Revision is viewed in light of these precedents
and theories, the underlying reasons for both sides' positions be-
come clearer.
II. THE COUNCIL OF REvIsION IN NEW YORK STATE
While English practices and contemporary political theory
provided the general backdrop for the debates over the Council of
Revision, a more tangible influence on the Framers was the New
York Council of Revision. At the time of the Constitutional Con-
vention, only two state constitutions provided a veto power over
the legislature. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 granted a
limited veto power to its Governor and the New York Constitution
of 1777 vested the veto power in a Council of Revision.3' Other
states' constitutions provided no structural check at all upon the
lawmaking power of the legislature.2 The Framers thus had three
state models of judicial involvement in the legislative process from
which to choose: the Council of Revision, the executive veto, and
no veto at all. Given the fear of legislative tyranny that pervaded
the debates at the Federal Convention, instituting no check was an
implausible alternative.3 3 Therefore, the Framers were faced with a
choice between a Council of Revision, in which the judiciary played
a direct role in lawmaking, and a presidential veto, in which it did
not.
28 2 Farrand at 75 (cited in note 21).
21 1 Farrand at 139 (cited in note 21).
30 See McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum 81-85 (cited in note 22).
" For the text of the New York Constitution of 1777, see Ben Penley Poore, 2 The
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United
States 1328 (GPO, 2d ed 1878) ("Poore"). For the text of the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, see 1 Poore at 956. Part 2, Chapter III, Article II of the Massachusetts Constitution
provides that the governor or legislature could require the supreme court to give opinions on
"important questions of law" and on "solemn occasions," but the judiciary was given no
formal lawmaking power. Id at 968-69.
32 See, for example, the Delaware Constitution of 1776 in 1 Poore at 273-78 (cited in
note 31).
33 See text accompanying notes 61-64, discussing the Framers' fear of legislative domi-
nance in the federal government.
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The New York Council of Revision provided a blueprint for
the proposed national Council of Revision. The Framers relied
heavily on the New York Constitution's principle of a strong check
on the legislature. Before the Federal Convention, James Madison,
the chief architect of the proposed national Council of Revision,
expressed his admiration of the New York Council. s4 Writing in
defense of the executive veto in Federalist 73, Alexander Hamilton
noted the utility of the New York Council in the formation of
laws. "' Given the influence of the New York Council on the minds
of these prominent Framers, a knowledge of its structure and oper-
ation is essential to understanding the proposal made at the Fed-
eral Convention and the Framers' debates over that proposal.
The story of the New York Council of Revision reveals one of
the most novel and ambitious experiments in the history of Ameri-
can governmental institutions. Soon after the colonies declared in-
dependence from England in 1776, New York adopted its first con-
stitution. According to Gordon Wood, the framers of this
constitution were "[t]orn in two directions-between the inherited
dread of magisterial despotism and a fear of popular disorder
which was greater than that of any state at the time .. ."' To
avoid these two extremes, they chose a middle road by creating a
Council of Revision, which checked the popular will of the legisla-
ture while refusing to place the power to check that will in a single
person. Section III of the New York Constitution of 1777 estab-
lished the Council:
And whereas laws inconsistent with the spirit of this constitu-
tion, or with the public good, may be hastily passed: Be it or-
dained that the governor for the time being, the chancellor,
and the judges of the supreme court, or any two of them, to-
gether with the governor, shall be and hereby are, constituted
See, for example, Madison's letter to Caleb Wallace, dated August 23, 1785, concern-
ing a potential constitution for Kentucky. Madison wrote that:
As a further security against fluctuating & indegested laws the Constitution of New
York has provided a Council of Revision. I approve of such an institution & believe it is
considered by most intelligent citizens of that state as a valuable safeguard both to
public interests & private rights.
Robert A. Rutland, et al, eds, 8 The Papers of James Madison 350-51 (Chicago, 1973). See
also Madison's comments on Jefferson's decision to include a Council of Revision in his
draft of a constitution for the state of Virginia. 11 Papers of James Madison 292-93.
" Federalist 73 (Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers at 441, 446 (cited in note 22). It
should be noted, however, that Hamilton's praise of the New York Council may have been
influenced by his desire to persuade the people of New York to ratify the federal
Constitution.
36 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 433 (cited in note 23).
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as a council to revise all bills to be passed into laws by the
legislature ....
The language of this provision closely resembles that of the provi-
sion for a proposed federal Council of Revision. 8 The contours of
the Framers' idea for a federal Council of Revision become even
clearer when one considers the actual operation of the New York
Council.
The basic structure of the New York Council was straightfor-
ward. Membership consisted of the Governor, the state Chancellor
(the chief judicial officer in the equity branch), and the Justices of
the Supreme Court, or any two of them acting together with the
Governor. The legislature presented all bills to the Council. The
Council reviewed the bills and could veto any of them by a major-
ity vote of its members. The legislature could override a veto by a
two-thirds vote in both legislative houses. 9
The primary purpose of the Council was to revise legislation.
Thus, if the Council objected to any measure of a bill, it would
return a detailed list of its objections to the legislature.4 ° The legis-
lature could change the bill to conform to those objections, over-
ride the objections, or simply let the bill die.41 During its existence,
the Council returned 169 bills to the legislature with objections.42
The legislature overrode 51 of these vetoes and reenacted at least
26 bills with various degrees of modification.43 This activity reveals
the substantial role that the Council played in the early lawmaking
process of New York.
The New York Council of Revision could veto legislation on
virtually any grounds. Between 1777 and 1787, the objections
raised by the Council in its veto messages ranged from an act being
"inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution"44 to an act being
passed without "the persons affected thereby hav[ing] an opportu-
nity of being heard."'4 5 Although most of the Council's veto
37 2 Poore at 1332 (cited in note 31).
3' See 1 Farrand at 21 (cited in note 21). The relevant language of the federal proposal
is quoted in the text accompanying note 59.
39 Id.
40 2 Poore at 1332 (cited in note 31).
41 Id.
42 Frank M. Prescott and Joseph F. Zimmerman, The Council of Revision and the Veto
of Legislation in New York State: 1777-1821 2 (SUNY Albany, Graduate School of Public
Affairs, 1972) ("Council of Revision').
43 Id at 5.
4, Alfred Billings Street, The Council of Revision of the State of New York 212 (Wil-
liam Gould, 1859).
" Id at 245. For a selection of the veto messages delivered by the Council, see id at 201-
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messages spelled out the detailed grounds for rejection and thus
resembled judicial opinions, others looked more like bald policy
pronouncements. In certain cases, for example, the Council vetoed
bills simply because it considered them "inconsistent with the pub-
lic good."'46 Justice Hobart, for instance, wrote an opinion rejecting
a smallpox regulation bill on these grounds. 7 Other messages were
characterized by overt moral or political sermonizing. For example,
in rejecting a bill that would have barred those convicted of adul-
tery from ever marrying, the Council reasoned that:
It might not, perhaps, be an improper punishment to confine
offenders of this class to a state of perpetual celibacy and
mortification within the walls of a cloister, but to suffer them
to remain in society without a possibility of remarrying is, in a
degree, to compel them by law to live in the open violation of
the rules of chastity and decency, ... 8
Unpersuaded by the Council's reasoning, the legislature overrode
the Council's objections.
The Council did not shrink from tough stands on controversial
or politically charged issues; indeed, it played a major role in New
York's early political struggles. Early in its existence, for example,
the Council vetoed an act that stripped certain Loyalists of their
citizenship and declared them aliens. Although a majority of New
York legislators favored the act, the Council did not hesitate to
reject it on seven different grounds, the first of which was that it
"contradict[ed] the fundamental laws of every civilized nation. '4 9
The Senate failed to override this veto. These examples of the
Council's vetoes illustrate both the breadth of its activity and the
range of reasons it could invoke to reject a bill.
One commentator has remarked that the members of the
Council "framed [veto messages] with great care, and they conse-
quently will be found marked by vigor, clearness and logical preci-
402. Prescott and Zimmerman calculate that "55.6 per cent of the Council's objections were
mainly for policy reasons, 21.8 per cent were for lack of constitutionality, and 12.4 per cent
were disallowed because they were deemed both 'inconsistent with the spirit of the Consti-
tution and with the public good' and other reasons of lesser significance." Prescott and Zim-
merman, Council of Revision at 43 (cited in note 42).
46 Id at 258. See also Nathaniel H. Carter and William L. Stone, rptrs, Reports of the
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821 55 (E. and E. Hosford, 1821) (remarks
of Judge Jonas Platt, claiming that 44 vetoes were based solely on this ground).
47 Street, The Council of Revision of the State of New York at 258-59 (cited in note
44).
" Id at 282.
49 Id at 246.
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sion, both in thought and expression."5 While it is true that most
of the Council's vetoes reflected attention to legal detail or consti-
tutional concerns, others were squarely predicated on blatantly po-
litical considerations. Indeed, the Council conceived of itself as a
potent political force. As Julius Goebel observed, "[t]he records of
the Council, especially in its early years of existence, demonstrate
that the membership conceived that it possessed a broad
mandate." 51
The New York Council gradually ran into problems as it be-
came mired in a power struggle with the legislature and as it came
to be perceived as an obsolete and dangerously undemocratic insti-
tution in an increasingly populist age. In 1821, after it deliberately
thwarted the Assembly's call for a constitutional convention, the
Council was bitterly reproached in the New York Assembly. The
Assembly had wanted to revise the state Constitution in order to
overhaul the Council of Appointment, a body responsible for ap-
pointments to government positions, which had deteriorated into a
sty of corrupt patronage.52 To do so, the Assembly passed a resolu-
tion calling for a constitutional convention with general, rather
than limited, authority to change the constitution. The Council, in
a message written by Chancellor James Kent, vetoed the propo-
sal.53 The Assembly overrode the Council's veto and lambasted the
Council for usurping the legislature's role as the democratic repre-
sentative of the people.5 4 Then came the convention.
At the convention, the Council of Revision itself became a ma-
jor issue. Opponents of the Council argued that it had "usurped
the power of judging the expediency as well as the constitutional-
ity of bills passed by the legislature" 55 and that it should therefore
be abolished and replaced with a purely executive veto. The Presi-
dent of the Convention claimed that "[t]he council had.., in fact
become a third branch of the legislature .... ,,51 Other delegates
contended that New York should follow the example of the na-
50 Id at 199.
" Goebel, 1 History of the Supreme Court at 104 (cited in note 12).
" Charles Z. Lincoln, 1 The Constitutional History of New York 620-26 (Lawyers Co-
operative, Rochester, 1906).
" Id at 624-25.
' Id at 626.
11 Carter and Stone, Reports of the Proceedings at 55 (cited in note 46) (Remarks that
Judge Jonas Platt attributed to delegate Peter R. Livingston, the principal drafter of the
1777 New York Constitution).
56 Id at 79. Delegates also expressed their outrage at judicial involvement in "party
strife" and an alleged deterioration in the public's confidence in the judiciary. See id at 71
(remarks of Martin Van Buren); id at 83 (remarks of Abraham Van Vechten).
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tional government by adopting an executive veto.57 A small band of
judges, led by Chancellor Kent, defended the Council on the
grounds that it had not usurped legislative power, but had instead
fulfilled its constitutional function by preventing the passage of
unwise and unconstitutional legislation." The judges' argument
did not prevail. The new constitution of 1821 placed all veto power
in the Governor and abolished the Council of Revision.
The New York Council initially fulfilled its purpose of provid-
ing a compromise between the monarchic attributes of an execu-
tive veto and the dangers of unrestrained legislative power. Partic-
ularly at the time of the Federal Convention, the New York
Council was a popular, efficient, and respected institution of gov-
ernance that the Framers might well have adopted without many
reservations. However, over time, the workings of the New York
Council revealed the inherent structural and political weaknesses
of an institution that drew members of the judiciary into political
battle and thereby threatened democratic decision making. Indeed,
the events preceding the end of the New York Council indicate
that a council or council-like structure on the federal level could
have eventually posed a major threat to the democratic underpin-
nings of the national government.
Ill. THE PROPOSAL, DEBATE, AND REJECTION OF THE COUNCIL OF
REVISION AT THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Resolution 8 of the original Virginia Plan contained the propo-
sal for a national Council of Revision. John Randolph officially
submitted the proposal to the Convention on May 29, 1787. It read
as follows:
Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the Na-
tional Judiciary, ought to compose a council of revision with
authority to examine every act of the National Legislature
before it shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature
before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent
of said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the act of
the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particu-
lar Legislature be again negatived by [ ] of the members of
each branch.59
57 Id at 47 (remarks of Peter A. Jay). The entire range of arguments for and against
abolishing the Council is given in id at 44-121.
58 Id at 87-88.
59 1 Farrand at 21 (cited in note 21).
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By its terms, this resolution proposed a body that would have the
power to veto all federal laws passed by the Congress and either
approve or reject congressional vetoes on state laws." The Framers
debated this proposal, and a variation of it that would have
presented bills separately to the President and to the judiciary, on
June 4, June 6, July 21, and August 15 of 1787. This section of the
comment will examine the arguments for and against the Council
in order to discern the basic substantive and structural principles
that motivated the Framers' rejection of it.
A. Arguments in Favor of the Council
Supporters of the proposed Council advanced three main ar-
guments in its favor. First, they argued that the Council of Revi-
sion provided a needed check on the legislature in the separation
of powers system. James Madison and James Wilson argued that
the President would need the judiciary's help to check the power
of the legislature because an executive veto alone would not suffice.
Wilson asserted that the executive and the judiciary could only
"preserve their full importance against the legislature" by jointly
exercising the veto power."' Madison added that a Council, unlike
a single, weak executive, would "render [the] Check or negative
more respectable.... 62 Since the legislature would have "a power-
ful tendency.., to absorb all power into its vortex" the Constitu-
tion had to give "every defensive authority to the other depart-
ments" as long as such authority was "consistent with republican
principles. ' e
At the time of the Federal Convention, the widespread phe-
nomenon of overbearing state legislatures supported Madison and
Wilson's warning that the President alone would be an ineffective
check against the Congress. 64 The delegates to the Federal Conven-
tion, like those at the New York Convention of 1777, were justifia-
10 Because the Convention rejected a congressional veto over state laws, this comment
will not address the Council's review of such vetoes. The issue was not addressed in the
debates over the Council.
61 1 Farrand at 105 (cited in note 21).
62 Id at 108.
63 2 Farrand at 74 (cited in note 21).
" A concise discussion of the Framers' fear of overly powerful legislatures at the time
of the Convention can be found in Wood, Creation of the American Republic at 403-09
(cited in note 23). In his famous study of 19th century American government, Woodrow
Wilson makes the argument that the whole first century of the American government was
marked by congressional dominance and executive weakness. Woodrow Wilson, Congres-
sional Government: A Study in American Politics (Houghten Mifflin, 1925).
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bly concerned about the potential for either executive or legislative
tyranny. As in New York, the proposed Council of Revision offered
a compromise between these two extremes by placing a weighty
check upon the legislature while diluting the President's power by
forcing him to act in concert with the judicial branch in exercising
the veto.
A second argument for the Council of Revision posited that
the use of the legal knowledge and skills of judges would improve
the lawmaking process. Madison asserted that effective govern-
ment required "collect[ing] the wisdom of its several parts in aid of
each other whenever it was necessary."6 5 He elaborated upon this
idea by stating that legal advice from members of the judiciary
"would be useful to the Legislature by the valuable assistance it
would give in preserving a consistency, conciseness, perspicuity &
technical propriety in the laws .... -66 According to Madison, good
lawmaking required the input of judicial minds at the outset. Oli-
ver Ellsworth offered a variation on this theme by pointing out
that "[tihe law of Nations . . .will frequently come into question
[in legislating]. Of this the Judges alone will have competent
information. ''111
Under the reasoning of Madison and Ellsworth, the fact that
judges possessed unique skills and knowledge would enable the
Council to produce "better" laws. This reasoning led to the argu-
ment that judges should be able to decide on the wisdom, or pol-
icy, of a law. James Wilson argued that without judicial participa-
tion in lawmaking,
[f]aws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may
be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify
the Judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them have a
share in the Revisionary power, and they will have an oppor-
tunity of taking notice of these character[istics] of a law, and
of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the improper
views of the Legislature.68
As this passage shows, Wilson conceived of the judge's role as cor-
recting the "improper views" of the elected representatives, rather
than merely as a restrained and subordinate expositor with no role
in substantive policy making. Similarly, George Mason warned
" 1 Farrand at 110 (cited in note 21).
2 Farrand at 74 (cited in note 21).
6' Id at 73-74 (emphasis added).
Id at 73.
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that if judges were limited only to inquiring as to the constitution-
ality of a law after the law had been passed, "every law however
unjust[,] oppressive or pernicious, which did not come plainly
under this description" would be given free course. 9 Mason added
to this conception by noting that judges would be particularly
skillful in resisting unwise laws because "they are in the habit and
practice of considering laws in their true principles, and in all their
consequences. 1 70 Mason apparently assumed that judges' legal
skills would help them to determine the wisdom as well as the con-
stitutionality of a law. He made no mention, however, of what cri-
teria, other than personal preference or legal soundness, the judges
would have used to decide if a law were "unjust" or "oppressive,"
or of what factors would constrain this decision. To delegates such
as Wilson and Mason, judges were the ultimate guardians of the
polity.
The New York Council demonstrated the feasibility of the
idea of a national Council because it presented a concrete example
of judges making substantive public-policy decisions and playing
an important role in the separation of powers system of New York.
The wide range of reasons that the members of the New York
Council could invoke to revise a bill squared neatly with the broad
powers that Mason contemplated for judges sitting on a national
Council of Revision. Moreover, the New York Council functioned
as a check upon the legislature in much the same way that dele-
gates such as Madison and Wilson contemplated the national
Council would function as a check upon Congress. In other words,
the New York Council was the embodiment of the Council of Revi-
sion envisioned by Madison, Wilson and other proponents of the
proposal for a federal Council.
In championing the Council, however, delegates such as
Madison seem to have overlooked the danger that a policy making
role for the judiciary, while appearing a practical and expeditious
way of resolving the legal issues that plague legislation, could seri-
ously impinge upon the more fundamental policy of popular sover-
eignty. Under that principle, "good" lawmaking was not a function
of legal skill, but of the will of the people. A Council of Revision
would have taken advantage of the legal skills that the judiciary
could bring to lawmaking, thereby fulfilling Madison's broader goal
of each branch aiding the others where such aid was possible. How-
ever, this could only be achieved at the cost of giving unelected
4" Id at 78.
70 Id.
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officials the power to make policy which would, in turn, undercut
the notions of popular sovereignty that animated the whole Con-
vention. As will be seen, this concern played a significant part in
the defeat of the proposed Council.
A third argument in favor of the Council of Revision sought to
counter the claims that a Council would radically depart from the
sacrosanct principle of "judicial independence." Proponents of the
Council pointed to the strong English precedent of mingling the
judiciary in the exercise of non-judicial powers, and argued that
this practice should be followed by the federal government, as it
had been in New York. Drawing upon the historical precedents ex-
amined earlier, Gouverneur Morris asserted that:
The truth was that the Judges in England had a great share in
ye Legislation. They are consulted in difficult & doubtful
cases. They may be & some of them are members of the Legis-
lature. They are or may be members of the privy Council, and
can there advise the Executive as they will do with us if the
motion succeeds. 1
In response, opponents of the Council asserted that the general
principle of "judicial independence" was inviolate and essential to
a strict separation of powers system, despite contrary practices in
England.7 2
Ultimately, this dispute was between a rigid and a flexible the-
ory of the separation of powers. Madison, a pragmatist when it
came to the separation of powers, reminded the delegates that,
"the Executive [in England] had an absolute negative on the laws;
and the supreme tribunal of Justice (the House of Lords) formed
one of the other branches of the Legislature. 7 3 Using these Eng-
lish practices as examples, Madison argued that one could not real-
istically establish a government upon an overly doctrinaire inter-
pretation of political philosophy; some accommodations to practi-
cality had to be made. The separation of powers could only work in
practice by combining the branches where the system required
such combinations for its efficient operation. To "guarantee the
provisions on paper," the separation of powers had to be flexible
and accommodate some overlap between the branches.74 Although
71 Id at 75.
72 See text accompanying notes 76-81.
" 1 Farrand at 139 (cited in note 21).
11 2 Farrand at 77 (cited in note 21). See also id at 78 (Gouverneur Morris states that
the Council would be a "defensive provision for securing the effectual separation of the
departments ....") (emphasis added); Federalists 47 and 51 (Madison) in The Federalist
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this argument prevailed in other contexts at the Convention, it
failed to convince the delegates that they should go so far as to
seat judges on a Council of Revision. The rejection of the Council
of Revision represented one of the rare triumphs enjoyed by the
proponents of a more radical separation of powers.
In the end, the case in favor of the Council of Revision came
down to three points: the need for a Council to operate as a check
against the legislature, the need for the skill and wisdom of judges
in lawmaking, and the historical practices in the English govern-
ment that supported a flexible separation of powers. All three ar-
guments had impressive historical and logical foundations and
were put forth by strong advocates. Yet these considerations failed
to tip the balance when weighed against the arguments raised by
those who opposed the Council.
B. Arguments Against the Council of Revision
Those delegates who opposed the Council of Revision held a
fundamentally different conception of the role of the judiciary in
the separation of powers system and the role of judges in the law-
making process from those in favor of the Council. The opponents
of the Council, driven by the ideal of a radically independent judi-
ciary, rejected the notion that the judicial branch should be used
as a check on the legislature, except by its exercise of judicial re-
view. In addition, they rejected the notion of policy making judges
on the grounds of democratic accountability and popular sover-
eignty. Finally, the Framers who voted to reject the Council were
concerned about the potential for biased judging and about the
sullied reputation of the courts should they become political
institutions.
Opponents of the Council of Revision argued that the Council
would threaten the delicate separation of powers system that the
Framers were trying to create. John Dickinson argued that placing
members of the judiciary on a Council of Revision would create
"an improper mixture of powers," which would skew the proper
functioning of the separation of powers system. 6 Elbridge Gerry
shared this sentiment.77 He and other opponents insisted that such
skewing would produce sinister results. Gerry claimed it would fos-
Papers at 300, 320 (cited in note 22).
75 For example, the executive veto (US Const, Art I, § 7, cl 2), the shared appointment
power (Art H, § 2, cl 2), and the impeachment provisions (Art I, § 2, cl 5 and § 3, cl 6).
71 1 Farrand at 140 (cited in note 21).
7 Id at 139.
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ter "an improper coalition between the Executive & Judiciary de-
partments" that would prostrate Congress and lead to tyranny. 8
Nathaniel Gorham asserted that it would lead to judicial domi-
nance of the executive.79 These Framers were particularly con-
cerned that a Council that possessed a substantial share of the leg-
islative power would tread too heavily upon the powers of Congress
and would dilute the power of the President.
The supporters of the Council attacked the position that com-
bining the judiciary and the executive on the Council would endan-
ger the separation of powers scheme. As discussed above, they felt
that the Council should play an integral role in checking the ex-
cesses of legislative power. Madison argued that if a judicial share
in the veto power violated the principle of a strict separation of
powers, then, by the same logic, so did a single executive's use of
the veto power.8 0 Yet it was not hard for opponents of the Council
to distinguish the notion of an "independent" executive from that
of an "independent" judiciary. The judiciary, unlike the legislature
and the executive, was not selected democratically. Moreover, in
his writings Montesquieu particularly emphasized the need to keep
the "terrible" judicial power isolated. 1
In a vein similar to Madison's, James Wilson labored to make
a distinction between lateral powers, like commanding the mili-
tary, which could only be vested in one branch, and collateral pow-
ers, like revising the laws, which could be vested in more than one
branch."2 Yet this strained distinction did not persuade those who
held to a strict notion of the separation of powers since it implied
that the judiciary was not an independent power, but just another
political branch. Political matters, however, were to be decided
only by representatives of the people-Congress and the President.
Such matters could not simply be assigned to the unelected mem-
bers of the judiciary, even as an additional structural check, with-
out seriously jeopardizing considerations of popular sovereignty.
Several opponents of the Council argued that a combination of
the executive veto and judicial review would provide sufficient
means to control a rambunctious Congress and that a Council was
therefore unnecessary. Elbridge Gerry, for example, argued that
placing the veto in the hands of the President would itself suffice
78 2 Farrand at 75 (cited in note 21).
79 Id at 79.
so Id at 77.
81 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws at 153 (cited in note 22).
82 1 Farrand at 140: 2 Farrand at 78 (cited in note 21).
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as a direct check against legislative excess."3 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court's power of judicial review would provide "a sufficient
check agst. [legislative] encroachments ..... "s Taking judicial re-
view as a given, Luther Martin opposed the idea of including
judges in the revisionary power because it would give them a
"double negative" over the laws when joined with the power of ju-
dicial review. 5 Under such reasoning, the Council's role as a check
would be not only dangerous, but superfluous.
A second argument raised by opponents of the Council of Re-
vision was that judges, by definition, should not decide matters of
public policy. Elbridge Gerry claimed that "[i]t was quite foreign
from the nature of [the judicial] office to make them judges of the
policy of public measures."88 Similarly, Caleb Strong stated that
"[n]o maxim was better established" than that "the power of mak-
ing ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding, the laws. 8 7
These statements, however, beg the deeper question of why the op-
ponents of the Council felt that judges should not decide matters
of public policy as a Council of Revision.
The Framers generally believed that judicial power should be
used to resolve private disputes between particular parties, not
matters affecting the general public.88 The opposition to judges as
policy makers was predicated upon the notion that judges should
only exercise this limited, inherent "judicial" power, not "execu-
tive" or "legislative" powers. This conception of a limited judicial
role stemmed from concerns of democratic accountability. Keeping
the power to make laws in the hands of elected representatives as-
sured such accountability. The ideal of popular sovereignty that
undergirds the entire Constitution requires that matters of general
public concern ultimately be decided by the people through their
electorally accountable representatives. "[A] knowledge of man-
kind, and of Legislative affairs [could] not be presumed to belong
to a higher degree to the judges than to the Legislature" because
unlike legislators, judges did not represent the people.8 9 Only those
83 1 Farrand at 97-98 (cited in note 21).
8, Id at 97 (Gerry).
85 2 Farrand at 76 (cited in note 21).
11 Id, 1 Farrand at 97-98 (cited in note 21).
837 2 Farrand at 75.
88 See Madison's discussion of "private rights" and "public good" in Federalist 10 in
The Federalist Papers at 53 (cited in note 22). See also, Walter Berns, Taking the Consti-
tution Seriously 202-06 (Simon and Schuster, 1987).
89 2 Farrand at 76 (cited in note 21) (remarks of Luther Martin). See also id at 73
(remarks of Gorham).
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who had faced the electorate were presumed to have "knowledge"
of legislative or public policy matters. To place unelected judges in
a policy making role on a Council of Revision would be perverse; it
would, according to Gerry, "mak[e] the Expositors of the Laws, the
Legislators which ought never to be done."90
Opponents of the Council next argued that placing judges in a
lawmaking role would bias the judges by involving them in both
the creation and the review of particular laws. Nathaniel Gorham
stated that "[J]udges ought to carry into the exposition of the laws
no prepossessions with regard to them."91 Similarly, Charles Pinck-
ney worried that placing judges on the Council would "give a pre-
vious tincture to their opinions." 92 Opponents of the Council saw
the potential for judicial "prepossessions" as a major theoretical
flaw in the structure of the Council, even though this problem
would not often arise in practice. The judges on the New York
Council of Revision, for example, only reviewed as a Court a very
small percentage of the laws that it struck down and the legislature
overrode.93 Moreover, when the Justices did review one of these
laws in the context of a case, the law would be enmeshed in a par-
ticular set of facts. This would limit the degree to which judges
could act on their policy biases. Understanding this, Madison ar-
gued that only a small fraction of the bills reviewed by the Council
would be "so ambiguous as to leave room for [a judge's] preposses-
sions. . . -"I Yet opponents of the Council apparently reasoned
that even the potential for this sort of structural bias was too great
to risk involving the judiciary in a dual role.
Finally, the Council's opponents worried that placing judges
on a Council of Revision would erode public confidence in the judi-
ciary, since it would cast the judges as players in the rough world
of partisan politics. Luther Martin, for example, claimed that con-
fidence "will soon be lost, if [judges] are employed in the task of
remonstrating agst. popular measures of the Legislature. ' 95 The
downfall of the New York Council and the demise of the powerful
English Privy Council of the early seventeenth century were attrib-
utable in large part to the involvement of judges in partisan poli-
tics and the corresponding decline of public confidence in an im-
90 Id at 75.
91 Id at 79.
92 Id at 298.
Prescott and Zimmerman, Council of Revision at 43 (cited in note 42).
1 Farrand at 138 (cited in note 21).
95 2 Farrand at 77.
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partial judiciary. In England, the political involvement of the judi-
ciary helped kindle the Civil War; in New York it led to a major
constitutional crisis and subsequent constitutional revision.
On June 6, 1787, the Federal Convention rejected the pro-
posed Council of Revision, as described in the Virginia Plan, by a
vote of eight to three."6 On July 21, the Convention voted down the
same proposal upon reconsideration, four to three (with two dele-
gations divided). 97 On August 15, Madison made a last ditch effort
to involve the judiciary in the lawmaking process by submitting a
proposal that bills be presented separately to the executive and to
the judiciary for review. The Convention soundly rejected this final
proposal by a vote of eight to three. 8
IV. THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRAMERS' REJECTION
OF THE COUNCIL OF REvISION
Current debate over a variety of controversial political and le-
gal issues continues to raise questions concerning the role of the
judiciary that the Framers discussed and decided upon in the de-
bates over the Council of Revision. The history of the Council of
Revision has often been used in analyzing these issues. Raoul Ber-
ger, for example, has relied on the Framers' rejection of the Coun-
cil of Revision to support his argument for a narrow interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Berger viewed the rejection of the
Council as "the most significant single piece of evidence that the
Framers excluded the judiciary from policymaking ... ."'0 Several
Supreme Court Justices have invoked the Council in controversial
cases. In Griswold v Connecticut, Justice Black relied on the rejec-
tion of the Council to support his argument that the promulgation
of vague, malleable standards in Fourteenth Amendment cases is
"an attribute of the power to make laws, not of the power to inter-
pret them."''1 1 And in Board of Education v Barnette, a First
1 Farrand at 140 (cited in note 21).
' 2 Farrand at 80.
'8 Id at 298.
" Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment 300-06 (Harvard, 1977).
100 Id at 300.
201 381 US 479, 513 n 6 (1965) (Black dissenting). For similar treatment of the history
of the Council of Revision in Fourteenth Amendment cases, see Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US
254, 273 (1970) (Black dissenting) (courts were to have "no part whatever in making any
laws," citing the rejection of the Council of Revision in support); Saia v New York, 334 US
558, 571 (1948) (Jackson dissenting) (in discussing a law challenged as an excessive grant of
discretion to a police chief, Jackson stated that he "did not suppose our function was that of
a council of revision."); Lewis v City of New Orleans, 415 US 130, 140 (1974) (Blackmun
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Amendment case, Justice Frankfurter referred to the Council of
Revision in an effort to bolster his dissenting argument that the
Court lacked the power to exercise "supervision over
legislation.' 1 2
Others have invoked the Council of Revision in discussing the
doctrine of standing, an issue that raises similar questions about
the role of the judiciary in the lawmaking process. For example,
Justice Powell offered an elaborate analogy between the Council of
Revision and the potential effects of a liberalized standing law:
Unrestrained standing in federal taxpayer or citizen suits
would create a remarkably illogical system of judicial supervi-
sion of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government.
Randolph's proposed Council of Revision, which was repeat-
edly rejected by the Framers, at least had the virtue of being
systematic; every law passed by the legislature automatically
would have been previewed by the Judiciary before the law
could take effect. On the other hand.., the allowance of pub-
lic actions would produce uneven and sporadic review, the
quality of which would be influenced by the resources and
skill of the particular plaintiff. And issues would be presented
in abstract form, contrary to the Court's recognition that 'ju-
dicial review is effective largely because it is not available sim-
ply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to
remedy a particular, concrete injury.""3
On the other hand, Professor Gene Nichol has argued that the role
of the courts under a liberal standing regime cannot be compared
to the role of the Council of Revision for three reasons: the Council
was part of the enacting process itself rather than post-enactment
review; review by the Council was directed at the wisdom of the
bill, not merely its constitutionality; and, though the Framers re-
jected the Council, the Framers never doubted the existence of ju-
dicial review.104 He therefore believes that such comparisons
should die a "quiet death."'1 5
dissenting) (the Supreme Court's use of overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to invalidate
legislation can "usurp the prerogative of democratic government," making the Court a
"council of revision"); Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 778 (1976) (Rehnquist dissenting)
("The Civil War Amendments did not make this court into a council of revision").
102 319 US 624, 649-650 (1943) (Frankfurter dissenting).
103 United States v Richardson, 418 US 166, 189-91 (1974) (Powell concurring) (cita-
tion omitted).
104 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 Cal L Rev 68, 93-94 (1984).
100 Id at 94.
[56:235
Council of Revision
Two recent constitutional controversies also touch on two of
the primary concerns raised in the debates over the Council. In
Morrison v Olson,10 6 the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether the judicial appointment of a special prosecutor was con-
stitutional, deciding ultimately that the separation of powers was
not endangered by such an arrangement. In upholding judicial par-
ticipation in the Federal Sentencing Commission in Mistretta v
United States, the Supreme Court was forced to confront ques-
tions regarding the role of judges in deciding matters of substan-
tive public policy as well as perceptions of judicial independence."'
While the history of the Council of Revision cannot, of course,
conclusively dispose of these issues, it can reveal the broad struc-
tural and substantive principles that the Framers furthered in re-
jecting the Council and can serve as a guide to discovering both the
proper operation of the separation of powers system and the role of
judges and the judiciary in that system. These principles are rele-
vant to analyzing current issues not simply because they evince the
Framer's intentions, but more importantly because they are crucial
to preserving the functioning of our constitutional system.
In searching for the policies underlying the rejection of the
Council of Revision, one should bear in mind that the Framers
were presented with and rejected a concrete model of direct judi-
cial involvement in the lawmaking process. The Council of Revi-
sion proposal had an impressive pedigree in English and colonial
institutions and a blueprint for its construction in the New York
constitution. It was not lightly considered. The Framers knew how
such an institution would function in practice and deliberately re-
jected it because that function did not conform to the structural
and policy choices the Framers incorporated in the rest of the Con-
stitution. The rejection of the Council was one of the crucial deci-
sions made at the Convention. It exemplified the Framers' decision
to repudiate generally accepted notions of the judicial role in favor
of a radically different conception of that role.
On a structural level, the Framers' rejection of the Council
demonstrated their adherence to a rigid, rather than a flexible,
separation of powers system with regard to the role of the judici-
ary. Despite the strong arguments of Madison and Wilson in favor
of a more flexible system, and despite the Framers' willingness to
permit such flexibility in other areas, the opponents of the Council
decided that they could not countenance a deviation from the role
'08 108 S Ct 2597 (1988).
107 Mistretta v United States, 57 USLW 4102 (Jan 8, 1989).
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given to the judiciary in Montesquieu's strict, albeit exaggerated,
theoretical model of the separation of powers. They concluded that
such a deviation would have harmed the delicate balance of power
within the national government.
Yet the importance of this balance is found in the principles
that underlie it. On a policy level, the debates show that the Fram-
ers sought to balance the need for a check on Congress against the
dangers of giving the unelected judiciary power to make policy.
The Framers clearly recognized the need for a check on the legisla-
ture: they premised their rejection of the Council upon the condi-
tion that the Courts would have the power of judicial review. This
condition qualifies the Framers' determination that a Council of
Revision was not necessary to the effective functioning of the sepa-
ration of powers system. The Framers intended to involve the
courts as a check in the separation of powers system, but not in as
direct a manner as a Council of Revision with an integral role in
the lawmaking process would have allowed. Rather, the Framers
intended the courts to function as an indirect check on the Presi-
dent and Congress through judicial review.
The Framers rejected the direct check that the Council would
have provided because of the dangers of involving judges in the
lawmaking process. Even though the advantages of such a practice
were presented to them, the delegates decided that the qualitative
improvement in legislating that judicial involvement would argua-
bly bring was outweighed by three goals: popular sovereignty, elec-
toral accountability, and judicial neutrality. The history of the
New York Council of Revision reveals the wisdom of this judg-
ment. Although the New York Council proved to be an acceptable
institution in the early years, it increasingly blocked the surge of
popular government and created significant political turmoil. The
rejection of a national Council of Revision not only evinced dis-
trust of judges in a lawmaking role and desire to keep them out of
political debate, but also affirmed that democratic representation
should pervade all of public policy making.
The Framers heartily disputed all of these matters, but in the
end, they based their decision to reject the Council not upon its
novelty or its technical impracticalities, but upon fundamental
principles of governance. These principles have not been rendered
obsolete by time. Indeed, they remain crucial to preserving the de-
sign of government created in 1787.
CONCLUSION
The Council of Revision is often invoked as a rhetorical
Council of Revision
weapon to argue for a more restrained role for the courts. Yet the
history of the Council of Revision has more significance than
merely lending rhetorical luster to vigorous dissents or strident ar-
ticles. As this comment has shown, the Framers seriously consid-
ered the Council of Revision and their rejection of it reflected firm
decisions about fundamental principles of the constitutional order.
The Council was not, as it has sometimes been treated, an implau-
sible or radical idea. Rather, the Framers rejected it because the
legitimate policies for which it stood did not outweigh the argu-
ments that were marshalled against it.
In retrospect, the saga of the New York Council of Revision
suggests that the Framers were right. While the New York Council
of Revision initially fulfilled its task of providing a compromise be-
tween legislative and executive dominance, it became, over time,
an obsolete remnant of the tradition of using judges in the law-
making process. It also posed a substantial threat to the growing
democratic principles that held that the only legitimate form of
legislating was with the consent of the governed. Courts and com-
mentators should take heed of the historical relevance that can be
gleaned from the Framers' decisions to reject the Council of Revi-
sion, to divorce the American judiciary from the long tradition of
judicial intermingling and to sculpt for courts and judges a unique
and limited role in the Constitutional scheme.
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